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Abstract 
Social media platforms have become powerful enough to cause perceptible effects in societies 
on a global scale. They facilitate public discussion, and they work with excessive amounts of 
personal data – both activities affecting human rights and the rule of law.  
This specific service requires attention from the regulator: according to this paper, a new legal 
category should be created with clear definitions, and a firm delineation of platforms’ rights 
and responsibilities. 
Social media companies should not become responsible for third-party content, as this would 
lead to over-censorship, but they should have the obligation to create and maintain safe and 
secure platforms, on which human rights and the rule of law are respected. In particular, they 
should maintain the transparency and viewpoint-neutrality of their services, as well as protect 
the personal data of their users. The paper sheds light on the similarities and differences from 
traditional media, and sets out detailed policy recommendations. 
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Executive summary 
The internet's vast opportunities to facilitate free speech had been thought to advance the level 
of democratic participation and a discussion based on reason, instead of self-interest or political 
power. Social media platforms have become powerful enough to cause perceptible effects on 
the political discourse on a global scale. Their impact has reached a level that threatens 
democratic processes and social stability.  
Providing platforms has become a successful business model in several industries, but in media 
it has an outstanding significance due to its impact on the formation of public opinion. Their 
activity has some resemblance to traditional media, but even more important are the 
differences: they do not edit content although algorithmically organise it, they work with 
excessive amounts of personal data and their market is more concentrated. However, they are 
still expected to neutrally transmit ideas without imposing their own agenda, and to facilitate 
public discourse on a larger scale than ever before in the history of mankind.  
This paper argues that platform providers, and among them social media companies, should be 
given a specific place on the map of service providers. Their particular role indirectly 
compromises basic fundamental rights, democratic public discourse and the rule of law. These 
responsibilities call for a new pattern of regulation, which clearly defines their rights and 
obligations. For example, social media companies should not be accountable for third-party 
content, because as private entities they cannot ensure the constitutional safeguards that are 
necessary to respect freedom of expression. But they can be responsible for creating and 
maintaining a safe and secure framework through administering the platform's communication 
environment, which can include prioritising diversity, identifying advertisements, protecting 
users' personal data and empowering users through transparent algorithms. Such a detailed 
approach is recommended because the problem is more fluid than just regulating illegal or 
harmful content. Flooding the conversation with the help of bots and trolls with irrelevant or 
false information, attacking persons with a troll army to discourage their communication or 
targeting individual users with tailored and therefore manipulative information cannot be 
tackled by regulation of content. The main research questions are (i) what are the 
responsibilities of social media and (ii) to whom should it be accountable? 
The following recommendations involve the extension of existing legal principles to platform 
providers, among them social media platforms:  
1) The e-Commerce Directive should be amended with a new definition of platform providers, 
including a basic definition of the extent of their rights and obligations.  
2) Platform providers must not apply viewpoint discrimination in their algorithmic structuring 
of content or in any action as part of administering their platforms.  
3) Content selection algorithms should offer options for users, and foster diversity.  
4) Interoperability would be needed to prevent the formation of monopolies; dominant 
market powers must have legal responsibilities.  
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5) All advertisements, including political advertisements, should be clearly distinguishable 
from voluntary content. Existing rules on political and public issue advertising are to be 
extended to any publication method, with special regard to online media, including social 
media. Advertisers must be identifiable for users.  
6) Other recommendations are specifically addressed at the new functions of platform 
providers:  
7) Platforms should ensure – by technological means of supervision or verification – that 
accounts are registered by human individuals rather than by artificial intelligence or bots; 
otherwise, bots, virtual personalities, trolls and influencers (political parties, NGOs, 
communication agencies) should be identified as such. 
8) Implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation has to consequently and 
meticulously be enforced; this may need to be assisted by interpretative guidelines.  
9) Platform providers should have explicit responsibility for protecting their users' personal 
data, including the prevention of hacking and leaks, as well as illegal activity that 
compromises the protection of personal data on their platforms, and for informing users 
about the processing of their data and effectively offering users the right to opt out of data 
processing.  
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1. Problem setting 
Deliberative democracies are built on the free exchange of information, and an uninhibited 
public discourse. An open public discourse is one of the basic conditions of democracy, because 
this is how citizens can discuss their common matters, form political opinions and ultimately 
reach a political decision (e.g. voting in elections).1 The relation between freedom of 
expression, the right to receive information and informed participation in a democracy clearly 
illustrates the triangular nature of democracy,2 according to which democratic processes, the 
rule of law and human rights are “inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and 
interdependent on each of the others".3  
Social media companies have become key actors in the formation of public opinion. The 
popularity of social media has contributed to the crisis of journalism and traditional media, it 
has accelerated social movements (e.g. #MeToo, Black Lives Matter) and contributed to 
political changes, as shown by the Arab Spring and by the 2016 US elections. Social media 
appears to be a powerful instrument to promote connection and communication for those who 
devote time and resources to use it. Its rules and principles have been formed mainly by market 
interests until this year. In 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)4 as well as 
other tools and regulations worldwide tried to tackle the adverse effects that are regarded as 
being caused by social media companies. But what is their responsibility really, and to whom 
are they accountable?  
This paper argues that online platform providers, and among them social media platforms, offer 
a new package of services by aggregating information and providing a bridge between supply 
and demand – whether it is goods like those on eBay, transport like Über, tourism like Airbnb 
or content like that on Facebook or Instagram.5 Social media services are particularly different 
from traditional media services, as explained below. The rights and obligations attached to this 
new structure of services are not governed by a legal framework.  
This complex type of new service requires a new pattern of regulation. The current schemes of 
self-regulation and the old scheme of mass media regulation would either be insufficient to 
                                                     
1 Bayer et al., “Disinformation and propaganda – Impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and 
its Member States”, Study for the Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf, pp
. 11, 52.  
2 Ibid., at p. 61.  
3 S. Carrera, E. Guild & N. Hernanz, “The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism”, Study, CEPS, Brussels, 2013.  
4 General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. 
5 See also in: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”, COM/2016/0288 final.  
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tackle the problem, or violate the principles of free expression. In the first case, the financial 
incentive may prove to be more attractive than meaningful self-restriction. In the other case, 
to mitigate the risk of being fined, social media companies are inclined to delete even 
constitutionally protected expressions, without the constitutional safeguards of limiting the 
fundamental right of free expression. The German Network Enforcement Act, 
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, GNDG, 2017) is an experiment in this regard, where the state 
outsourced censorship to social media platforms, obliging them to remove criminally 
prohibited content. This censoring activity remains opaque and unaccountable to an 
independent body, with no data on how effectively it protects the rights of citizens. In addition, 
removing criminally illegal content solves only a minor share of the problems in the public 
discourse. More details about the GNDG are below in section 4.2.  
Distorting the public discourse with the help of artificial amplification mechanisms, aggressive 
distribution and manipulation techniques reaches beyond the problem of ‘illegal content’. This is 
why focusing on content regulation alone would not deliver sufficient results. 
The most influential social media company, Facebook, has repeatedly been used as the vehicle 
for political manipulation, and the strategic abuse of personal data: in the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal the personal data of approximately 87 million Facebook users was processed without 
the users' consent and utilised to create psychographic profiles, which were then used for 
targeted political campaigning. This illustrates why the protection of personal data can be a 
cornerstone for the protection of human rights and the rule of law in the realm of new 
technologies. While traditional services, such as banks, law firms and medical service providers, 
are obliged to treat personal data confidentially, the new IT services are not subject to such 
regulation. Until the GDPR, they appeared to treat internet users' personal data as their own.6  
While Facebook, Inc.'s public relations focus on its cooperativeness, with repeated apologies 
and promises to create a safe place, these fall short of being accountable for its actions, which 
is not possible until its responsibilities are legally defined. For example, the prohibition of 
discrimination in conveying its services, whether based on gender or viewpoint or the explicit 
obligation to protect users' personal data, among others, should be declared in its regard. 
The reach and impact of these new actors may be even larger than that of the biggest 
traditional media enterprises ever known. They affect societies even though they are not 
editors of content – but they do set the rules of transmission, defining how widely a message 
can be heard and which users will encounter it. Their practices have profoundly impacted public 
discourse, which forms the foundation of democratic societies. This significant power of 
platform providers justifies state intervention. 
Besides the frames of responsibility, also the directions of accountability of platform providers 
need to be defined. The diverse set of obligations of platform providers could be supervised by 
                                                     
6 J. Zittrain, “Engineering an Election” (20 June 2014), Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 127, 2014, p. 335; Harvard 
Public Law Working Paper No. 14-28, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457502, at 340.  
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independent authorities with appropriate competences to enforce the obligations, such as the 
authorities for data protection, electoral commissions, authorities responsible for consumer 
protection, competition or telecommunications. 
Freedom of expression can be limited only under narrow conditions: among others, only laws 
can prescribe limitations, these must be capable of achieving a legitimate social goal that is 
necessary in a democratic society, and the limitation should not affect the essential content of 
the right. In addition, only courts are entitled to enforce any such limitation. To ease the 
enormous caseload of courts, self-regulatory bodies like the complaints commissions and press 
boards, which are operated by the national media authorities in some EU member states, could 
decide, and judicial remedy should be granted against their decisions.  
2. The new public sphere 
The public sphere is the physical or virtual community space where citizens share and exchange 
their views and opinions on matters of public interest.7 Such public discourse serves the 
formation and discussion of political decisions. A democracy is built on public discourse, the 
successor of the ancient ‘agora’.  
In the age of the traditional mass media, much of this public discourse was centrally organised 
by media actors, content was distributed in forms of hierarchical pyramids from a few centre 
points to the masses of people. Mass media content represented the elites' culture, and the 
cycle of content production involved several layers of control.  
Social media has fundamentally changed this structure: it has created a horizontal, interactive 
discursive space for the public. Even though dominant actors of the mainstream media still 
exist, currently they enjoy no privilege among the many other players of this deliberative space 
where all users play with equal chances. Every individual has the chance to build a popular 
social media profile or launch a blog or online journal. This was celebrated once by the early 
cyber-optimists for providing equal opportunities to all views, and for elevating democracy to 
a higher level. Indeed, the political discussion has become wider, more inclusive and colourful: 
the online discourse has enabled many minority views to be heard for the first time. This has 
led to public recognition of the sufferings of war, revelations of sexual abuse and domestic 
violence, to name a few. But in recent years, the drawbacks of these same features have also 
been experienced.  
A public sphere that goes global is inducing noticeable changes in social and political actions. 
Online information campaigns have become used as strategic warfare by certain states. Some 
states choose to close their communication borders, like China, North Korea, Bangladesh and 
Iran. Liberal states keep their media spaces open, which therefore can be penetrated and 
shaped by anyone, including foreign citizens, entities or other states.  
                                                     
7 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, 
MIT Press, 1991 (Sixth edition). 
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The attention economy and the characteristics of social media favour short, simple and 
emotional messages, rather than rational deliberation, which provides a fertile ground for 
populistic messages. While a cause-and-effect relationship can be debated, we can observe 
that democratic processes and values are being challenged,8 in which social media discourse 
also plays a role.  
2.1 Features of social media communication  
Among the many other changes in global society, the new media environment is one of the 
accelerators that generates social changes. The most important characteristics are listed below. 
1) There are no entrance barriers for publication: anyone can have any number of accounts, 
even anonyms. This enables the creation of fake profiles as well.  
2) There is insufficient privacy protection: while anonymity is possible, it is the exception – 
the average user is exposed and taken advantage of by more powerful users.  
3) There is no differentiation between individual and company users, with no separation 
between private, commercial or political content; nor is the identification of sponsored 
content ensured.  
4) The communication is horizontal and networked, with no central distribution hub, reactive 
and interactive.  
5) Moderation, supervision and control are technically possible, but their legal circumstances 
need clarification. Platform providers facilitate interaction with their algorithms. They also 
provide tools for users to amplify their own content. These tools may amend how content 
is perceived by other users, and thus they affect the market and in our case, the public 
discourse.  
6) The reach is global: the boundaries of online communities' discussions are fluid. Their reach 
is not limited to the relevant political community – anyone can participate, including from 
other communities. The possibility for external influence, and even manipulation, has 
manifestly grown.9 
These characteristics have transformed the communication market in many respects, of which 
two are pointed out below.  
• Platforms connect users and knock out old gatekeepers. The function of platform 
providers has been enabled by the P2P technology of the web: platforms aggregate and 
redistribute information. Similar to search engines, auction sites, booking or dating sites, 
                                                     
8 F. Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.  
9 While there were previous examples of social manipulation (e.g. the Iranian coup d'état, 1953), the online 
environment offers far more convenient tools to carry out such.  
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they knock out traditional gatekeepers whose job was to collect and process content, and 
to make matches between supply and demand. They serve as new gatekeepers only if 
the market is too concentrated – and such is the case with social media (see below). This 
is a new function and it cannot be squeezed into existing categories of media.  
• Platforms have created a global village.10 Social media puts different types of 
communication into the same basket: private and public, voluntary11 and sponsored, 
amateur and professional communications. Without the separation of these types of 
communication, legal obligations for professional, public and sponsored content are 
difficult to enforce – especially if they can hide behind anonymous and fake accounts. 
Private individual communication deserves a higher level of constitutional protection; 
however, individuals with large social networks can turn their private messages into 
publicly held views within an hour. This can even turn into action: casualties occurred in 
India as a consequence of fake WhatsApp messages shared among private individual 
messaging groups.12  
3. Media vs social media 
3.1 The newly emerged functions of social media platforms  
Social media's role and functions are significantly different from those of the traditional mass 
media. Below the major differences and similarities between traditional media and social media 
are listed.  
Platforms are not editors. Traditional media actors exercise editorial functions over the content 
distributed. As editors, they define what can be published in the media, and what prominence 
should be given to each aspect of content. Most of the content that they distribute is created 
by professional journalists or advertising agencies that also carry responsibility for the content. 
But the decision on what is published – even regarding small advertisements or readers' letters 
– is entirely the responsibility of the editor. In contrast, social media platforms do not produce 
or edit content. No matter how powerful social media platforms may appear, their role is 
limited to conveying and facilitating communication, with the added value of amplification. 
Users expect that platforms do not alter or remove posts, unless reported by the user 
community.  
                                                     
10 The term "global village" was originally coined by Marshall McLuhan, but gained new meaning in the online age: 
distances are meaningless, rumour and gossip spreads with the speed of light, privacy gets easily compromised. 
M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The extensions of Man, MIT Press, 1994 [1964].  
11 The adjective "voluntary" is used to describe content that is not sponsored or not published for commercial or 
marketing purposes. 
12 “How WhatsApp helped turn an Indian village into a lynch mob”, 19.7.2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-44856910; “India lynchings: WhatsApp sets new rules after mob killings”, 20.7.2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-44897714. 
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Expectation of impartiality. An editor may set the tone of the media product, and choose to 
favour one or another political side.13 Social media companies also have the technical possibility 
to give preference to opinions representing a certain viewpoint on their platforms. However, a 
systematic favouring of one political view would be unacceptable from dominant social media 
platforms. Users would expect social media to neutrally transmit the content of all users 
without discrimination – but this is not a legal obligation at the moment. Users can count on 
the goodwill of the largest social media actors (Google, Facebook) whose owners declare their 
commitment to democratic values. But Chinese and Russian social media platforms (WeChat, 
Vk.com, Ok.ru) are on the rise; mergers and acquisitions can also lead to changes in the 
ownership and user policies of social media platforms. Even though Mark Zuckerberg diligently 
appeared before the US and EU parliamentary bodies, recent revelations show that Facebook 
likewise did not refrain from using disinformation and manipulation as marketing devices.14 
Algorithmic design. In contrast to traditional mass media, which conveys primarily content 
created by professional journalists, entertainers or politicians, social media facilitates the 
participation of masses of individual citizens. While theoretically this could fulfil the dream of 
an ideal state of public discourse, it has been found that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is distorted 
by small aspects of software: algorithms and bots. These give more prominence to certain 
content and less to others – as well as selecting which content is offered to which users. The 
spontaneously posted views of individuals cannot compete with the industrialised tailoring and 
dissemination techniques. On the positive side, these enable small start-up companies, NGOs 
and individuals to ‘boost’ their posts with a small amount of money, and to utilise the 
demographic targeting offered by Facebook.  
Dependence on personal data. Social media is in a position to be able to collect an excessive 
amount of personal data. The user data is utilised to perfect the algorithms used to personalise 
the newsfeed based on personality traits and history, in order to maximise user attention so 
that the time spent on the platform grows.15 For advertisers, this is a great revolution: they can 
get to know their potential customers and offer personalised advertising to all of them, thereby 
attracting even more customers. From the perspective of social media platforms, users' 
personal data is their asset; however, even users make use of one another’s personal data, 
when they surf the platform and view other users' activity.  
Ownership concentration. Social media is significantly more concentrated than traditional 
media. It has more users, more revenues and owns bigger stakes of the market.16 Facebook 
                                                     
13 Note that the Anglo-Saxon type of media aims to be objective (Hallin-Mancini), even though this is usually 
unsuccessful. Mediterranean types of media outlets openly confess and represent their political inclinations.  
14 “Facebook policy chief admits hiring PR firm to attack George Soros”, The Guardian, 22 Nov. 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/21/facebook-admits-definers-pr-george-soros-critics-
sandberg-zuckerberg. 
15 The average daily time spent on social media was 116 minutes a day in Oct. 2018 (www.brandwatch.com). 
16 See the numbers at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-
users/. 
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had 2.234 billion users in 2018, Instagram, at 6th place, had 1 billion. The time spent on social 
media is comparable to television: 40 minutes daily on YouTube, plus 35 minutes on Facebook 
on average.17  
Even though some of the social media companies are behemoth, it is unrealistic to expect that 
several competing social media companies provide parallel services in the same user segment, 
because their main value is exactly the size of their accessible social network – unless the 
interoperability of parallel platforms is ensured. The competing social media companies – 
Twitter, Pinterest, Snapchat and LinkedIn – offer slightly different services. Also, they attract 
various age groups: Facebook is most popular with the older generation, while the younger 
generation prefers Instagram (also owned by Facebook, Inc.) and Snapchat (owned by 
Alphabet, the parent company of Google and YouTube). A majority of users are registered with 
several platforms and regularly use several different ones.18 Research suggests that this has 
positive effects on the public discourse.19  
The huge social impact and the level of concentration may raise the idea of imposing public 
service obligations on giant companies, such as diversity, 'must carry' rules and the obligation 
to conclude a service contract without discrimination. Following a more beaten track, fusion 
control by a rigorous competition authority could be considered to confront large company 
families (Facebook–Instagram or Google–YouTube–Snapchat).20 
3.2 Similarities of social media and traditional mass media 
Despite the substantive differences, some similarities may be noted between social media and 
traditional mass media that can justify regulatory intervention.  
1) Television and radio were regulated more strictly than the printed press partly because of 
their "pervasive effect".21 The early internet was regarded as a medium that induces more 
conscious consumption, called "pull", as opposed to the "push" type of television.22 
Nevertheless, streaming video and especially the handheld devices have radically changed 
                                                     
17 Although television still takes the lead, this is largely caused by a demographic fact: older people watch 
significantly more television compared with youngsters, who spend more time on social media platforms. See the 
statistics at https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2016/television-is-still-top-brass-but-viewing-
differences-vary-with-age.html. See also: “How Much Time Do People Spend on Social Media?” [Infographic], 2017 
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/marketing/how-much-time-do-people-spend-social-media-infographic. 
18 “Social Media Use in 2018”, http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/. 
19 “Social media usage that involves participation in several networks reduces mass political polarization and echo 
chambers”, see at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc111529.pdf, p. 27. 
20 “66 Facebook acquisitions – the complete list 2018”, https://www.techwyse.com/blog/infographics/facebook-
acquisitions-the-complete-list-infographic/. 
21 Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
22 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); L. Lessig, “What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 
vs. Filtering”, https://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/what_things.pdf. See also: “Two eras of the internet: pull 
and push”, 21.12.2014, http://cdixon.org/2014/12/21/two-eras-of-the-internet-pull-and-push/. 
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the way – and the level of consciousness – in which their content is consumed. The 
objective of the content selection algorithms is to make the service addictive and maximise 
user-engagement time.23 Today's social media encounters can be intrusive – especially the 
related ads – and addictive for users, which justifies protection of the individuals.  
2) Social media has a significant social impact also at the level of societies. While the cause 
and effect of individual events cannot be proven scientifically, reference to the Arab Spring 
revolutions as the "Facebook revolution" by academics,24 and the repeated compromises 
of personal data by Facebook are signs of this. Actions of disinformation and manipulation 
have been proven25 and their impact on democracy – although not scientifically proven – 
can be a cause for concern.  
Cause and effect have been very much contested in media effect theory as well.26 The 
correlation between violent audiovisual content and harm for youth is still debated, but 
this has not prevented legislators globally from restricting such content on mass media.  
3) Social media platforms are also a vehicle for free expression and public discourse. It could 
be examined whether having an online profile is an element of the right to free expression. 
If a social media platform as dominant as Facebook denied registration for a user without 
a justified reason, that would substantially limit the user’s possibility to get his or her ideas 
across to the audience. It should be considered whether dominant social media platforms 
have a duty to provide their services to customers without discrimination.  
                                                     
23 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Opinion on online manipulation and personal data, 3/2018, p. 13, 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf. 
24 See for example: M. Ben Moussa, “From Arab Street to Social Movements: Re-theorizing Collective Action and 
the Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring”, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
2013, pp. 47-68, (2), 47, https://doi.org/10.16997/wpcc.166; S. Harlow, “It was a ‘Facebook revolution’: Exploring 
the meme-like spread of narratives during the Egyptian protests”, Revista de Comunicación, 12 (2013), pp. 59–82; 
or A. Bruns, T. Highfield & J. Burgess, “The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter 
Users and Their Networks”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 57, No. 7, 2013, pp. 871–898, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764213479374. 
25 S. Bradshaw and P.N. Howard, “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media 
Manipulation”, Online Supplement to Working Paper 2018.1, Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford Internet 
Institute, 2018, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct_appendix.pdf; S. Bradshaw 
and P. Howard, “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation”, 
Working paper no. 2017.12, University of Oxford, 2017, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops-Trolls-and-Troublemakers.pdf; E. Brattberg and T. Maurer, “Russian 
Election Interference – Europe’s Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks”, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington, 2018; I. Brodnig, “7 types of misinformation in the German election”, 2 November 2017, 
https://firstdraftnews.org/7-types-german-election/. 
26 See the contesting theories of Harold Lasswell (bullet, 1927), Paul Lazarsfeld (two-step influence, 1948), Joseph 
Klapper (selective perception, 1949), George Gerbner (cultivation, 1969), McCombs and Shaw (agenda-setting, 
1972), Herman and Chomsky (framing, 1988), Dayan and Katz (performative effect, 1992) – to name a few. 
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The listed similarities can provide a basis for imposing certain restrictions and obligations on 
social media platforms.  
4. Existing legal regulation of social media platforms 
4.1 The responsibility structure of the e-Commerce Directive 
The question of liability for third-party content emerged already in the 1990s, especially in the 
UK and the US. In the Godfrey v Demon internet case, the internet service provider refused to 
remove the allegedly defamatory statement (the case ended finally with a settlement).27 After 
a series of legislative and judicial developments in the US, the EU drafted the e-Commerce 
Directive,28 which set out a clear structure of liability for the transmitted content. The Directive 
aimed at liberalising online commercial activity, but also at "constitut[ing] the appropriate basis 
for the development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing and disabling access to 
illegal information". According to this, those hosting third-party content are not liable as long 
as they have no actual knowledge about its illegal nature, and when they obtain such 
knowledge, they act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information (the notice-
and-takedown regime). The service providers are not obliged to monitor content that they 
transmit and search for signs of illegal activity (Article 15).  
Just after the e-Commerce Directive was passed in 2000, technological innovation changed the 
internet's potential so immensely that it was dubbed ‘Web2.0’. Since about 2003, this has 
enabled lay individuals to publish content through user-friendly platforms, which has become 
the default mode of communication on today’s internet. This technology is used in hundreds 
of other services: Über, eBay, Airbnb, Tinder, blogmotors, etc. These services all aggregate and 
classify information, making it possible for customers to get to the service directly, without a 
human agent.29 Another layer of service providers has central operators who actively select 
and edit the content provided. Amazon, Booking.com and eBay differ from each other like The 
Sun Online differs from Facebook, in that the latter has no central editor, while the former does.  
No generally agreed term has been crystallised yet to name the latter type of service provider: 30 
they are sometimes called platform providers, intermediary service providers or "internet 
                                                     
27 Godfrey v Demon Internet Service [2001] QB 201. 
28 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic 
commerce').  
29 N. Helberger, J. Pierson and T. Poell, “Governing online platforms: From contested to cooperative responsibility”, 
The Information Society, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2017.1391913. 
30 The European Council Decision (March 2018) called them "social networks and digital platforms", another 
instrument "hosting services that allow[s] the upload of third party content", adding that "such providers of 
information society services include social media platforms". See the Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online. 
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intermediaries",31 and a subgroup of them are called "video-sharing platform provider[s]" by 
the 2018 Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS) Directive, although the Commission 
appears to have developed the term "online platforms",32 as in "those online platforms"33 and 
"online platforms that distribute content".34 This paper uses the wording ‘platform providers’ 
to designate those services that convey third-party content with value added services, of which 
‘social media’ is a subcategory. 
The e-Commerce Directive's narrow definition is not capable of including these platform 
providers, because Article 14(1) applies only to the storage of information, with the condition 
that "this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the 
information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information 
which is transmitted or stored" (recital 42).35 
The Directive also empowers member states (recital 48) to require service providers that host 
information provided by users to apply duties of care in order to detect and prevent certain 
types of illegal activities. Thus, for example, the GNDG can rely on this empowerment. On 
another note, creating a diverse regulatory environment within the EU would counter the 
purpose of the Directive and the interests of the EU not only as a market, but also as a Union 
of democratic societies.  
In sum, the e-Commerce Directive envisages that service providers should be liable for 
cooperating and applying duties of care to prevent certain types of illegal activities, but 
excludes that they should be directly liable for content which they transmit or store. Still, the 
wording of the Directive excludes direct applicability to platform providers, which emerged a 
few years after its creation.  
4.2 The German Network Enforcement Act  
Germany has introduced a controversial new law aimed at the enforcement of German criminal 
content restrictions on social media platforms.36 The GNDG is based on the notice-and-
takedown system: upon notice, the service provider is obliged to remove the content. The law 
orders the removal of content that appears to be contrary to certain sections and subsections 
of the German Criminal Code (listed in the GNDG). The law's subjects are those social media 
platforms that have at least 2 million registered users within Germany. A new element of the 
GNDG is to introduce strict rules for the notice system, including a transparent procedure to 
handle user complaints, short deadlines, reporting obligations and considerable fines. Content 
                                                     
31 Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries. 
32 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/glossary#Online_Platforms. 
33 Commission Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online. 
34 Communication from the Commission on tackling online disinformation. 
35 See also: C-324/09 L'Oréal and others v eBay, judgment of 12 July 2011.  
36 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken, 
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245. 
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found to be "manifestly illegal" should be removed within 24 hours, and within 7 days in other 
cases. The fines for not complying with the mentioned obligations are considered relatively 
high: up to €50 million, depending on which obligation was violated.  
The significance of the GNDG has been the introduction of very short deadlines for the removal 
of notified content, the threat of meaningful fines, the prescription of transparency and the 
demand to report data for the assessment of its operation.  
The GNDG can be criticised for ‘outsourcing censorship’: the state seemingly gets relieved of 
the cost of dealing with illegal content – but this takes a toll on freedom of expression. Private 
companies cannot ensure the same safeguards for fundamental rights as independent courts. 
The notice-and-takedown procedure urges platforms to err on the side of caution to avoid high 
fines. The contributor of ambiguous content has no options for defending his or her post and 
preventing removal – this could be exploited for political or other motivations.  
The day after the GNDG came into effect (in January 2018), anti-migrant hate speech posted 
by the far-right AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)37 was removed from Facebook, stirring the 
first controversy. The satirical newspaper Titanic posted a parody of the AfD post in which it 
used the same contested word (Barbarenhorden) and its account was temporarily suspended. 
This is a clear signal that the GNDG's operation is not without ambiguity.38 Even despite the 
reporting obligation, little is known about what types of content are reported, what is removed 
and how exactly the decisions are taken. A further reason for criticism is that GNDG 
enforcement is supervised by the German Federal Office of Justice, which directly reports to 
the minister of justice, whereas the rule of law would be satisfied by supervision that is 
independent from the government.  
The majority of criticism affecting the GNDG is that of the notice-and-takedown system (see 
below in detail). This procedure, which is now the dominant instrument against illegal content, 
can be regarded as moderately chilling, as it puts a burden on intermediaries and on content 
providers – with the winners being those who send the notice. Research has identified recent 
cases of malevolent notice-and-takedown practices, in order to suppress legitimate voices 
online. Both human-operated and automated accounts have been used to falsely mass-report 
legitimate content or users in Armenia, China, Ecuador and Russia.39 The noticed content or 
accounts are temporarily suspended, even if the platform provider eventually reinstates them.  
It should also be noted that users of platform services encounter material almost exclusively of 
their online friends, and they always have the option to silence a feed that they do not like.  
                                                     
37 F. Pergande, “Ein Gesetz gegen die AfD?”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8.1.2018, 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/netzdg-ein-gesetz-gegen-die-afd-15378459.html. 
38 “Bundesregierung will NetzDG überprüfen”, Zeit Online, 8.1.2018, http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2018- 
01/netzwerkdurchsuchungsgesetz-bundesregierung-soziale-netzwerke-berichte. 
39 S. Bradshaw and P.N. Howard, “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media 
Manipulation”, Computational Propaganda Project, University of Oxford, 2018, p. 12.  
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4.2.1 The notice-and-notice system vs notice-and-takedown 
The notice-and-takedown system pressures service providers to judge whether content is 
lawful or not.40 This carries the threat of over-censorship, and fails to provide the constitutional 
safeguards of free expression. In addition, it is regularly abused by malicious noticers seeking 
to have their competitors' content removed or suspended.41  
A system that pays more respect to the freedom of speech is already applied in the UK's 
Defamation Act 2013 Section 5, and in the Copyright Modernization Act, or Bill C-86 of 
Canada.42 Under the so-called notice-and-notice regime, the service provider should forward 
the notice to the actual content provider, if that is possible (or otherwise, remove the content). 
This system encourages users, who are the real providers of the questionable content, to bear 
responsibility for their own content and to settle their disputes individually. In Canada, even 
this regime was quickly exploited by alleged copyright holders, who pressured users into paying 
a small sum as a settlement, until legislative amendment excluded this possibility.43  
The UK Defamation Act 2013 took note of the uncontrollable volume of online user-generated 
content, acknowledging that it leads to a higher threshold needed for triggering the judicial 
system. It recognised that the provider should not be expected to decide on the illegal nature 
of the content, and therefore introduced a well-designed procedure to facilitate dialogue 
between the content provider and the complainant.44  
4.3 Case law of the CJEU and ECtHR on the responsibility of intermediary service 
providers  
4.3.1 L'Oréal v eBay 
In L'Oréal v eBay,45 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found that eBay, referred 
to as an "intermediary service provider", was not entitled to rely on the exemption from liability 
provided by Article 14 of the Directive, because its activity was not confined to technical and 
automated processing of the data relating to the offers that it stored, but it played an active 
role – providing the customer with assistance consisting in particular of optimising the 
                                                     
40 See, e.g. the German Network Enforcement Act.  
41 This can have substantial influence in the last days of an election campaign. See also: J. Bayer, “Liability of 
Internet Service Providers for Third Party Content – A comparative analysis with policy recommendations”, VUW 
Law Report Special Edition, Wellington, New Zealand, 2007, pp. 1-109. 
42 See https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/Oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02920.html. 
43 See more in “Canadian Government Banning Settlement Demands in Copyright Notice-and-Notice System”, 30 
Oct. 2018, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/10/noticesystemfix/. 
44 See a detailed explanation in: P. Bárd and J. Bayer, “A comparative analysis of media freedom and pluralism in 
the EU Member States”, Study for the LIBE Committee, PE 571.376 EN, 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses. 
45 C-324/09 L'Oréal and others v eBay, judgment of 12 July 2011. 
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presentation of the offers or promoting them. It further declared that it is for the national 
courts to carry out this assessment.  
The argumentation of the Court is not conclusive enough to draw conclusions on whether or 
not intermediary service providers could in theory be subject to the e-Commerce Directive.46 
Although the Court was silent on this issue, through argumentum a contrario we may conclude 
that eBay would not be subject to the Directive.  
4.3.2 Delfi v Estonia and MTE & Index v Hungary47 
The Estonian online news portal Delfi was fined by the national courts for third-party 
comments, even though it removed them after notice, but the national courts found that 
Articles 12-14 of the Directive did not apply to Delfi. In Hungary, a civil organisation and a news 
portal were fined for third-party content. In both cases, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) made its decision based on the presumption that the applicants were liable for third-
party comments.  
Notably, eBay, Delfi, MTE and Index all believed that they could avail themselves of the 
exemption provided in Articles 14-15 of the e-Commerce Directive, and regarded the 
questionable content as third-party content for which they bore no liability. The ECtHR did not 
address the issue of foreseeability48 or the attribution of liability.49 In fact, the applicants should 
have invoked the e-Commerce Directive instead of the European Convention on Human Rights 
as their main claim was that the content was not attributable to them, rather than claiming 
their right to freedom of expression.  
These cases signal a considerable level of insecurity in the legal interpretation of the roles and 
responsibilities of online service providers for third-party content. 
                                                     
46 It did not consider the question that providing assistance to the customer was an automated service offered to 
any customer, and that it did not entail that the "operator" (yet another term used) received actual knowledge 
about the items to be promoted or offered for sale. Instead, it referred the decision to the national courts, adding 
that the national measures should not require an operator of an online marketplace to monitor the goods offered 
for sale through its platform – but it did not base this opinion on Article 15 of the Directive, which explicitly declares 
that no such monitoring should be required. 
47 Delfi v Estonia (App 64569/09) ECtHR 2015 and MTE and Index v Hungary (App 22947/13) ECtHR 2016. 
48 Which should have affected the question of "being prescribed by a (foreseeable) law" in the ECtHR judgment. 
But ECtHR accepted without hesitation that the restriction was foreseeably laid down in law. 
49 In Delfi, the content in question was racial hate speech, and in MTE and Index it was insult against a legal person. 
These conditions played a decisive role in the outcome of the judgments. Further, Delfi was profit-oriented, and 
MTE was a non-profit organisation (however, Index is also profit-oriented). In the Delfi case, the content 
represented hate speech, and the commenting section brought revenues to the portal, so the Court found that 
the moderate fine did not violate Article 10. In the MTE and Index case, the content itself did not go beyond 
justified criticism, and at least MTE was a non-profit portal of public interest issues.  
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4.4 The principle of immunity for third-party content 
The Council of Europe’s Recommendation (2018) on the roles and responsibilities of internet 
intermediaries held that "States should ensure, in law and in practice, that intermediaries are 
not held liable for third-party content which they merely give access to or which they transmit 
or store" but they should be "co-responsible, if they do not act expeditiously to restrict access 
to content or services as soon as they become aware of their illegal nature”,50 also adding that 
"State authorities should not directly or indirectly impose a general obligation on 
intermediaries to monitor content".51 The Recommendation uses the term "internet 
intermediaries", but from the context it is clear that it focuses mainly on ‘platform providers’. 
The Council of Europe’s “Study on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing 
Techniques (In Particular Algorithms)”52 also declared that states should not impose a general 
obligation on internet intermediaries to use automated techniques to monitor information that 
they transmit, store or give access to.53 
The recently passed amendment to the AVMS Directive clarifies that video-sharing platform 
providers can enjoy the exemptions from liability defined in the mentioned chapters, with 
reference to the e-Commerce Directive's Articles 12–15.54 Also the proposed e-Privacy 
Regulation includes this text.55 These are promising signs, but they do not clarify the situation 
of platform providers, including those social media platforms that are not subject to the AVMS 
Directive. By now, the situation has matured sufficiently enough to give such platform providers 
a place in the legal system. Their responsibilities should relate to their actual activities: the 
design and usage of algorithms, their handling of personal data, the maintenance of a safe and 
transparent environment, their conveying activity between advertisers and users, and the 
amplification of certain content to the detriment of other.  
                                                     
50 Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the roles and 
responsibilities of internet intermediaries (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 2018 at the 
1309th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) at 1.3.7.  
51 Ibid at 1.3.5.  
52 “Study on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing Techniques (In Particular Algorithms) 
and Possible Regulatory Implications”, Prepared by the Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries (MSI-
NET), https://rm.coe.int/algorithms-and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimension-of-
aut/1680796d10. 
53 Ibid., Recommendation no. 6, p. 46.  
54 In recital (48), Article 28(a)(5) and (b)(1)  
55 Article 2: “This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC1, in particular 
of the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-
0324+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
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4.5 The limits of self-regulation 
The Communication from the Commission on tackling online disinformation encouraged the 
establishment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, which came into being in September 
2018.56 The reflections of the Sounding Board on the Code of Practice signal that the platform 
providers did not leave their comfort zone when drafting their rules, claiming that the so-called 
Code "contains no common approach, no clear and meaningful commitments, no measurable 
objectives or KPIs, hence no possibility to monitor process, and no compliance or enforcement 
tool: it is by no means self-regulation, and therefore the Platforms, despite their efforts, have 
not delivered a Code of Practice".57 Indeed, the Code of Practice contains very cautious 
language to make "reasonable efforts" (not even best effort!) towards disclosing "issue-based 
advertising" and to improve the situation in fields such as the identification of automated bots 
or the impermissible use of automated systems (points 4, 5 and 6). There are a few clear 
commitments regarding the differentiation of advertisements from editorial content, which is 
already a basic principle in most jurisdictions (point 2). The evaluation of the steps taken by the 
stakeholders by 31 December points out the achievements and even more tasks to be done in 
the future.58  
The Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech online59 has been evaluated four times 
since 2016. While steady growth is observed in the ratio of removing reported materials, the 
reports do not reveal the aspects of decisions taken by the platform. A third of the notices do 
not receive feedback.60  
5. Conclusions 
Social media exercises a well-reasoned role on the effectuation of citizens' democratic 
participation in the public discourse. The framework that it offers impacts on how its users 
share and exchange information. The indirect impact on democratic processes has a potential 
to debase the rule of law. 
Social media does not fit into any of the classical concepts on media actors in the content 
distribution chain: it does not provide content, but it does more than automatically transmit 
information. In a few features social media platforms are comparable with traditional mass 
                                                     
56 Communication from the Commission on tackling online disinformation: A European Approach, Brussels, 
26.4.2018 COM(2018) 236 final, p. 7; Code of Practice on Disinformation, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.  
57 The Sounding Board’s Unanimous Final Opinion on the So-Called Code of Practice, 24 September 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation. 
58 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/code-practice-against-disinformation-2019-jan-29_en. 
59 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_on_countering_illegal_hate_speech_online_en.pdf. 
60 Results of Commission's last round of monitoring of the Code of Conduct against online hate speech, 19.1.2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612086.  
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media companies: (i) they have a significant impact on individuals (can become addictive) and 
on society's public discourse; (ii) they serve as a vehicle for free expression and democratic 
public discourse; and (iii) both are profit-oriented, and not likely to respect public interest goals 
unless they are forced to by law. In several other features they are distinct: (i) social media 
platforms are not editors or publishers (in the legal sense) of content; (ii) rather than defining 
an editorial line they amplify and personalise the content stream through algorithms, which rely 
on masses of personal data; (iii) they have no entrance barriers and do not separate public from 
private communication; and (iv) their market is more concentrated than that of media 
companies.  
Social media companies belong in the larger category of platform providers, which has become 
the dominant online structure of organising activities and is expected to further proliferate in 
future. Many of these platforms generate unexpected challenges in the affected economic 
sectors, even beyond the media sector. However, the media scene has outstanding significance 
because of its effect on society's public discourse.  
Consensus appears to have developed in holding social media platforms not responsible for 
third-party content (as long as they have no actual knowledge) and not obliging them to 
monitor. But, it is argued, this immunity should be balanced by their diligent administering of 
the platform's communication environment, including the identification of advertisements and 
the protection of users' personal data. Platforms must ensure that their environment is 
trustworthy and safe for every citizen. Content selection algorithms should follow transparent 
principles, empower users, and prioritise diversity and trustworthiness.  
Platforms – these meaningful business actors from eBay to Facebook – should be explicitly 
defined and their obligations regulated at the EU level.  
6. Recommendations 
Some of the recommended changes require amendments of existing laws to extend their scope 
on social media platforms. Others call for a new regulation, which would lay down basic rights 
and obligations for platform providers in general, with respect to a new service that is expected 
to proliferate in future (think of eBay, Über, Airbnb, Tinder, etc.), with safeguards for the 
protection of consumers and human rights. 
The recommendations do not suggest self-regulation: in this area, platform providers have 
done as much as they can within their market constraints by their terms of services and privacy 
policies. At this stage of technological and social change, the protection of human rights and 
democratic public discourse calls for legislative intervention. Because of the international 
nature of the services, the regulation should take place at the supranational level of the EU and 
extension of the rules to the global community should be sought. Similar to the GDPR, any rules 
should extend to foreign service providers as well, with the purpose of effectively protecting all 
persons within the EU.  
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The suggestions below are divided under three subtitles: establishing a definition is the basic 
condition of any further regulation. The other regulatory recommendations are distinguished 
by whether they can be interpreted in the context of existing media regulation or require a new 
approach towards platform providers.  
6.1 Definition of platform providers 
The e-Commerce Directive should be amended with the inclusion of a definition for the new 
layer of actors, platform providers, being those that provide a platform for third parties to share 
their content and to carry out various communicative actions. Their immunity for content 
should be defined in a similar way as that for hosting providers, but instead of solely having the 
notice-and-takedown procedure, the notice-and-notice procedure should also be enabled (see 
above). Reference to their responsibilities for attending to their platform and complying with 
other obligations as regards data protection, etc., may be included. The e-Commerce Directive 
should serve as a background law for other more specific laws – the GDPR and e-Privacy 
Regulation – and open the door for inclusion in the AVMS Directive with the given definition.  
Platform providers are neither authors nor publishers, but they could be made responsible for 
the activity that they actually perform: facilitation, dissemination, profiling (or not), managing 
accounts and cooperating with authorities. Social media is a subcategory within platform 
providers, and its role and position should also be defined within the media chain. 
 
Suggestions:  
• Create a new legal category for platform providers.  
• Define their obligation for content through the notice-and-notice procedure.  
• Make reference to their other obligations as regards data protection and other laws.  
 
Recommended action: Amend the e-Commerce Directive with a new definition of platform 
providers.  
Responsible actors: EU institutions.  
Drawbacks:  
i) The notice-and-notice procedure may not provide the required speed in all cases; 
therefore, it might be kept as an option. For ‘manifestly’ illegal cases the notice-and-
takedown procedure may still be acceptable – especially if safeguards for the protection 
of freedom of expression are added.  
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ii) The new category should be flexible, as the number of platform providers is likely to grow 
in the future with the advent of the sharing economy. Some platform providers have more 
central operative control, others have less.  
6.2 Recommendations in the realm of media regulation – Classical principles applied 
to social media  
6.2.1  Diversity, pluralism and impartiality 
Diversity and pluralism are related in media theory, both leading to the same goal: that citizens 
can encounter a variety of content from many different aspects. This can be approached from 
the perspective of ownership as well as the geographical, genre and political diversity of 
content.61 While the internet age provides for ubiquity of content, the scarcity of human 
attention and the technological possibilities of content selection result in less diversity than 
before (the filter bubble). This does not have to be so: content selection can be tailored 
according to the will of whoever designs and operates the algorithms. The demand side of 
diversity relates to how much a user is exposed to various types of content (exposure diversity) 
– which depends largely on the user and can be improved with increasing awareness and media 
literacy.  
Content selection algorithms should prioritise diversity and trustworthiness, and allow users 
options regarding their preferences – as is already done by some providers, for example in the 
privacy settings. Users should be able to choose the level of the required diversity on a slider.62  
Concentration of ownership is an issue of concern regarding social media enterprises, especially 
those most general ones like Facebook and YouTube, which practically do not have competitive 
alternatives.  
Given the nature of the service, users would benefit from alternative services of the same kind 
only if interoperability is ensured, i.e. if connections and communication is enabled between 
the platforms. If this is not the case, then the incumbent's position should entail specific 
obligations similar to ‘common carriers’ or to the regulation of public broadcasters within 
Europe:63 to ensure diversity, to give preference to high-quality, reliable sources (which are 
attested by fact-checkers, credibility indices) and public service content, to ensure impartiality, 
                                                     
61 See more in: P. Bárd and J. Bayer, "A comparative analysis of media freedom and pluralism in the EU Member 
States”, Study for the LIBE Committee, PE 571.376 EN, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-
analyses. 
62 N. Helberger, K. Karppinen & L. D’Acunto, “Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender 
systems”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2018, pp. 191–207, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900. 
63 See also: R. Caplan and D. Boyd, “Who Controls the Public Sphere in an Era of Algorithms? Mediation, 
Automation, Power”, 5.13.2016, https://datasociety.net/pubs/ap/MediationAutomationPower_2016.pdf, p. 5.  
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and to respect higher levels of privacy standards, the transparency of algorithms and flexibility 
of settings for the convenience of users.  
Facilitating public discussion is a great responsibility – platform providers have an ethical 
obligation to transmit users' messages without discrimination (impartiality). While it is accepted 
that media companies represent content selected according to their political agendas, this 
would not be accepted from social media platforms. Yet, currently there is no legal obligation 
to be impartial or prohibition on using algorithms for the promotion of a certain public issue. 
On the other hand, niche platform services could exist legitimately (such as Catholic platforms 
or LGBT dating platforms) provided that they transparently admit it.  
Expecting viewpoint diversity is connected to the obligation of impartiality. Above a certain size 
of the network, both obligations would be highly recommended.  
 
Suggestions:  
Algorithms  
• Impartiality should be obligatory – platform providers must not apply viewpoint 
discrimination in their algorithmic structuring of content.  
• Content selection algorithms need to include the principle of diversity (offering different 
views).  
• Platforms must inform their users about the content selection principles of their 
algorithms.  
• Users should have options on which principles they would like to use or reject, after 
receiving easily accessible information, using tools as simple as icons.  
• One option should be to prioritise content that is found trustworthy by independent news 
organisations.  
• Changes and experiments with new algorithms must be transparent, and provide easily 
accessible information to the users.  
Concentration of ownership  
• Fusion control should be exercised to prevent further concentration. 
• The obligation of interoperability must be prescribed in order to promote the emergence 
of competitors. 
• In the case of dominant market power, special public service obligations should be defined 
for social media platforms.  
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Recommended actions: Create a specific legal instrument to define the responsibilities of all 
platform providers, and among them social media providers. The options of appointing an 
existing competent authority (such as telecommunication and media authorities) or creating a 
new competent authority should be examined. 64  
Extending the AVMS Directive's scope to include platform providers is considered 
unsatisfactory for the following reasons:  
i) Only a few provisions of the AVMS Directive would be applicable to social media 
providers.  
ii) Social media providers are not audiovisual media providers. They share more common 
features with other platform providers, such as eBay, Tinder and search engines, than 
with audiovisual media providers. It would be more beneficial to create a wider regulation 
that applies to all platforms. Optionally, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive could 
open up its scope to include platform providers as it did with YouTube. However, YouTube 
– although a platform provider – transmits audiovisual content and this somewhat 
justifies its inclusion.  
Responsible actors: EU institutions should draft the recommended rules in consultation with 
technological experts.  
Proposed subject of the obligation: Platform providers.  
Drawbacks: Social media companies' freedom to provide services would be moderately 
restrained by this.  
Arguments against the drawbacks: The measurements are necessary in the interest of the 
principle of pluralism and to ensure a diverse public discourse, for the protection of democratic 
society.  
6.2.2  Identification of advertisements, notably political advertisements 
Platform providers should be responsible for clearly identifying advertisements and sponsored 
content as such (the principle of identification). This principle is horizontally applied in 
advertising regulations, including the AVMS Directive. Social media platforms halt and approve 
all paid content before putting the advertisement into effect. As opposed to voluntary content, 
advertisements (including boosted posts) that ensure a revenue stream for the social media 
platform are moderated and supervised by the platform provider, which has a higher level of 
responsibility for them compared with voluntary content. 
Identification of political advertising and public issue advertising should also be obligatory. At 
the same time, platform providers are able to label such content only if their publisher is explicit 
                                                     
64 See also the ongoing research project: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/algorithmic-awareness-
building.  
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about the payment factor and the subject matter of the content. But politicians and political 
parties can currently use social media on equal terms with private individuals and professional 
media companies that voluntarily publish politically motivated content as a legitimate exercise 
of their freedom of expression. Political parties and professional politicians should be regarded 
as ‘influencers’ in respect of political content, which is not independent information even if it is 
not sponsored. Anonymous accounts hinder the transparency of such influence (see below).  
There are fine lines between political advertisements and political jokes, opinion articles, 
emotional tweets or symbolic political speech, which are understandable only in the local 
context. Therefore, labelling political content based on its topic would pose a risk to freedom of 
expression. Political speech – whether sponsored or voluntary – forms a key part of the free 
public discourse, but it may be subject to restrictions.65 Informing users about the sources of 
political content when it comes from committed actors, such as politicians and political 
organisations, should be a basic requirement.  
Using micro-targeting and artificial dissemination methods for political advertising can change 
the turnout of an election, simply by encouraging certain people to vote and not others.66 
Artificial dissemination techniques give unfair advantage to the candidate with more financial 
resources, and therefore their use should be limited.  
The recommended principle should be horizontally applicable to all advertisements and not 
only in the media.  
 
Suggestions: 
• All advertisements, including political advertisements, should be clearly distinguishable 
from voluntary content.  
• Amendment is needed of member states' regulation of political and public issue 
advertising, along with an EU directive for harmonisation and EU-level regulation. 
• Existing rules on political and public issue advertising are to be extended to any publication 
method, with special regard to online media, including social media. 
• All procurers of political and issue-based advertisements should be clearly and publicly 
identifiable by default; if ads are purchased on behalf of third parties, these should also be 
clearly and publicly identified.  
• The obligation to ensure this shall be imposed on the advertisers and on the platform 
provider as a secondary liability.  
                                                     
65 Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom, 48876/08, judgment of 22.4.2013.  
66 J. Zittrain, “Engineering an Election” (June 20, 2014), Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 127, 2014, p. 335; Harvard 
Public Law Working Paper No. 14-28, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457502. 
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• Member states should make the necessary amendments to political and public issue 
advertising so that their safeguarding principles apply also to platform providers. Besides 
member states’ regulation, EU-level regulation (a directive) is recommended, with 
particular relevance to the European Parliament elections.  
 
Recommended action: Either a new piece of legislation for platform providers in general (so 
that the rules apply to all platform providers and not only to social media) or an amendment of 
an existing law that regulates advertising is recommended.  
Responsible actors: EU institutions and member states. Because of the transborder nature of 
social media, and the growing interdependence of political and public issues, this problem can 
be better solved at the supranational level. 
Proposed subject of the obligation: Platform providers. Accountability to a competent authority 
(consumer protection or telecommunication authority) is recommended.  
Drawbacks: The labelling of political advertising might induce platform providers to control 
politically loaded speech that is voluntarily shared by interested citizens. This could have a 
chilling effect on political communication.  
6.3 New, internet-specific regulatory principles 
6.3.1 Administering platforms  
Part of the chaos in the public discourse arises from the undistinguished mixture of various 
sources like commercial, political and civil actors, sometimes with multiple accounts, pseudo-
accounts, fake accounts or artificial intelligence. Users have the right to know the source of the 
information – especially if it affects public discourse or their legal interests (such as 
advertisements).  
The lines between user content and sponsored content are getting blurred, as not all 
persuasion comes in the form of paid advertisement, from product placement to influencers. 
The word ‘influencer’ is used here with reference to political parties, active politicians, 
governments and public authorities, NGOs and communication agencies, as well as the new 
brand of influencers themselves – an expression similar to ‘public figure’, but its scope is wider 
and more adapt to the current media environment. People who have a considerable influence 
on public matters have long been regarded as public figures, who have to tolerate a higher level 
of scrutiny from society.67 In the big pond of social media, these ‘big fish’ should be identified 
and their identity verified, to minimise attempts to mislead or manipulate users. The aim is to 
shift the current power relations in which private users are transparent and influencers can 
                                                     
67 Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v Austria (no. 2) – 10520/02, judgment of 14.12.2006. 
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remain opaque. While anonymity is highly treasured, it allows circumvention of the 
identification of advertisements.  
Commercial platform providers, such as eBay, require identification from their users, 
differentiate between occasionally active private sellers and professional users, and provide for 
user feedback on trustworthiness. Even though users utilise pseudonyms, the platform is 
regarded as a safe environment because users' authenticity is verified. The largest social media 
platform providers also require verification through an email address or actual postal address 
and/or mobile text message, and offer the option to create a page for professional users. 
Theoretically, users could have two or three profiles relating to their different social roles, 
although currently Facebook allows only one profile per user.  
The suggested verification scheme should also specify the safeguards for the protection of 
personal data. It should ideally distinguish at least three categories: (i) natural persons who act 
in their private capacities; (ii) natural or legal persons who act in their professional capacities; 
and (iii) those professional users whose activity is related to public issues, affecting the 
fundamental rights of individuals (political parties, medical service providers). Ideally, natural 
persons in their private capacity should not be subject to any verification; however, that would 
keep a back door open to fake accounts. Therefore, a low level of verification, for example 
through the eIDAS system,68 is recommended as a minimum, and the level of verification should 
grow from the least to the greatest scrutiny. 
Virtual models and virtual politicians69 are already among the users of social media: Lil Miquela, 
a fictitious model, has 1.5 million followers on Instagram, with her colleagues Bermudaisbae 
and blawko22 trying to catch up. These fascinating technological innovations can be useful (like 
chatbots), but their usage should not violate human dignity, which requires that bots do not 
mislead humans regarding their nature, and the principle of fair public discourse also demands 
that bots do not distort the marketplace of ideas.70 A regulative approach could range from 
simply identifying artificial intelligence as such, to its complete prohibition.  
Suggestions:  
• Platforms should ensure – by technological means of supervision or verification – that the 
accounts are registered by human individuals rather than artificial intelligence or bots. 
Deleting fake accounts should not be regarded as a virtue but as an obligation.  
                                                     
68 Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 73–114, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj. 
69 “Meet the world’s first virtual politician”, 15 Dec. 2017, https://www.victoria.ac.nz/news/2017/12/meet-the-
worlds-first-virtual-politician. 
70 Already envisaged in: European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, “Artificial Intelligence, 
Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems”, March 2018, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf. 
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• Bots, virtual personalities and trolls should be identified as such. 
• Influencers71 on public issues and in commercial promotion should be identified as such, 
through a combination of self-identification, a reporting mechanism and monitoring based 
on the number of followers.  
• Users who regularly reach large audiences with public issue content should be regarded as 
‘influencers’ (political parties, NGOs, communication agencies and other influencers) and 
should have a higher level of scrutiny (e.g. verification of the identity). 
 
Recommended action: New rules on the responsibilities of platform providers need to be 
created. This type of activity did not exist in the traditional media age.  
Responsible actors: EU institutions should draft this new rule in consultation with technological 
experts. 
The main objective of the recommended law is to maintain and protect the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights, through the maintenance of a public discourse that is inevitable 
for them.  
Proposed subject of the obligation: Platform providers. Accountability to a supervisory authority 
is recommended, for example, telecommunication authorities.  
Drawbacks: This recommendation is likely to attract controversy, because of its threat to privacy. 
The supervision and verification may exercise a chilling effect on users and influencers, 
particularly on those who represent minority views or are unfavoured by the ruling 
government, especially in illiberal states.  
Arguments against the drawbacks:  
− The threat lurks in insufficient or lack of data protection and not in the identification of the 
user category. The e-Privacy Regulation is expected to provide additional protection for 
personal data.  
− Public figures have been exposed to a higher level of public scrutiny and responsibility. This 
principle is adapted in the compulsory verification of influencers as such.  
− The current technology of some social media companies does not provide effective data 
security even for the personal data that are hidden according to the users' intention. In 
addition, autocratic states are inclined to apply secret surveillance against their political 
opposition in any case, and therefore the profile verification would not be the tipping 
point.  
                                                     
71 The word ‘influencer’ is used here with reference to political parties, active politicians, governments and public 
authorities, NGOs, communication agencies and the new brand of influencers themselves. 
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Benefits:  
− Users would have information about the source of content.  
− Influencers who possess better tools to represent their views are distinguished from 
natural persons who act in their private capacities.  
− Differentiating between user categories has a lesser chilling effect on free speech than 
differentiating on the basis of content. 
6.3.2 Protecting privacy and personal data 
Users' personal data and profiles are utilised to target them with tailored content, in order to 
maximise their engagement time, but also to manipulate their opinions. This violates users' 
right to privacy, right to protection of personal data and right to receive information.  
The protection of personal data is the most decisive factor in whether future technologies will 
serve or exploit people and societies. Social media acquires extreme measures of personal data 
about its users, including sensitive data. The GDPR requires that these are collected with a clear 
affirmative act establishing a "freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication" of 
the data subject's agreement (recital 32). Furthermore, consent should not be regarded as 
freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw 
consent without detriment (recital 42). These requirements are not always satisfied: users' 
options do not always appropriately allow free choice, or clear and concise information. 
Additionally, users are overwhelmed by consent requests, which results in "consent fatigue".72 
Social media activity – liking and sharing – also leaves valuable traces of personal data, which is 
harvested and processed by advertisers without users being informed or able to opt out.  
Industry actors' urge to utilise personal data as the fuel and the currency of social media and 
advertising business is understandable, but not justified. Other professions like doctors, lawyers 
and investment brokers also deal with masses of sensitive personal information, and they must 
refrain from monetising these in their own interests – they are obliged to do so by law.73 The 
attitude towards personal data processing needs to change: ownership of personal data by the 
data subject should be recognised, and companies that are trusted with the processing of such 
personal data must treat them confidentially.  
The GDPR allows the processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes on an opt-out 
basis, but the possibility to opt out should be "explicitly brought to the attention of the data 
subject and presented clearly and separately from any other information" (recital 70).  
                                                     
72 See noyb.eu, “GDPR: noyb.eu filed four complaints over ‘forced consent’ against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp 
and Facebook”, 25 May 2018, https://noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/pa_forcedconsent_en.pdf. 
73 J. Zittrain, “Engineering an Election” (June 20, 2014), Harvard Law Review Forum, Vol. 127, 2014, p. 335; Harvard 
Public Law Working Paper No. 14-28, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457502, at 340.  
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Micro-targeting for political advertising has in some cases been based on sensitive information, 
like "racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs" (Article 9), which 
should not be used for micro-targeting, or only under specific conditions (recital 71) that are 
not defined in the GDPR. It needs to be clarified – perhaps through the e-Privacy Regulation – 
that micro-targeting based on sensitive information can take place solely on an opt-in basis. 
Recital 56 of the GDPR creates a privilege for political parties but only on condition that 
adequate safeguards are established – and these safeguards have not been worked out yet. 
Natural persons can avail themselves of the ‘household exception’ during social networking or 
online activity if the data processing does not relate to any professional or commercial activity, 
which emphasises the need for a distinction between private and professional accounts.  
In sum, much remains to do to ensure compliance with the GDPR and with the hopefully even 
more effective e-Privacy Regulation in the future.  
Legal responsibility for the lawful processing of personal data may be shared by the platform 
provider and the user/marketer.74 
 
Suggestions:  
• The proposed e-Privacy Regulation should include 
o explicit reference to ‘platform providers’ and define social media as a subcategory of 
them;  
o the prescription that users opt in for targeted advertising;  
o the right of users to get more information about which of their data are used for 
content selection or micro-targeting, and have the right to exclude some personal data 
from this process; and 
o the need for users to consent through their own browser settings once, which is 
applicable to all websites. Also, interpretation of the GDPR allows this, and it could be 
clarified through guidelines.  
• The GDPR's implementation has to be meticulously enforced with special attention to 
social media platforms, making it clear and unambiguous that 
o sensitive personal data should not be processed for the purposes of profiling and 
targeting, or only on an opt-in basis; and 
o adequate safeguards for invoking the political privilege should be worked out.  
                                                     
74 Case C210/16 Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie 
Schleswig-Holstein GmbH.  
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• Platform providers' legal liability for protecting the personal data of their users must be 
clarified and include 
o prevention of hacking and data leaks; 
o monitoring and prevention of illegal activity that violates the protection of personal 
data on their platforms; and  
o information for users about which of their data are used for content selection or 
micro-targeting, and an offer to exclude some personal data from this process. 
 
Recommended actions:  
i) Include in the e-Privacy Directive reference to ‘platform providers’ and ‘social media’.  
ii) Supervise implementation of the GDPR, providing interpretations and guidelines, and 
sanctioning if appropriate. Test cases such as Brave v Google deserve special attention as 
the decision can bring substantial changes to the legal practice.75  
iii) Clarify legal responsibility for personal data by (a) guidelines and (b) the amendment of 
legislation, and (c) in the event that a specific legal instrument is set out to delineate the 
responsibilities of platform providers, it should contain these obligations.  
Responsible actors: European Commission, European Data Protection Supervisor and the 
European Data Protection Board. 
Proposed subject of the obligation: Platform providers.  
Drawbacks: No meaningful drawbacks were identified, aside from restraining the freedom to 
provide services.  
Argument against the drawbacks: Protection of personal data is a key factor in ensuring a user-
friendly environment for technological innovations. In future, the new services and 
instruments, such as the Internet of Things, virtual realities and artificial intelligence, should be 
developed with these strong data protection requirements already in mind.  
 
                                                     
75 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-privacy-complaint/mozilla-co-founders-brave-files-adtech-
complaint-against-google-idUSKCN1LS2JL. 
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